讲座时间：2016年9月9日上午10：30

讲座地点：科研楼C218

讲座题目：Strategy-proof Designs in Centralized-Control Wireless Networks

主讲人：Chih-Yu Wang

报告简介：The resource management problems in wireless networks are difficult since they involve complex competitions and selfish behaviors from participants. An operation that increases the participant's allocated resource inevitably reduces the resource for other participants, which results in competitions. Additionally, when the participants are or controlled by real humans, we can fairly assume that these participants are rational and therefore selfish. The competition effect and selfishness of participants in wireless networks imposes a serious threat to all existing solutions which assume that all participants will faithfully follow the orders of the system for some global objective. We notice that such an issue also exists in centralized-control network as long as the control mechanism relies on the feedbacks from selfish participants. Game theory is suitable for analyzing resource management problems in wireless networks. It can help analyze, predict, and regulate the selfish behaviors of participants in wireless networks. We demonstrate how game theory can help regulate selfish behaviors in centralized-control network with the following examples. In heterogeneous networks, we study the carrier aggregation mechanism in LTE-Advanced system. We observe that selfish users may untruthfully report their QoS requirements in order to manipulate the carrier activation and resource block allocation. Therefore, we propose a truthful auction with a greedy resource allocation algorithm in order to guarantee that all rational UEs truthfully report their QoS requirements. In D2D communication system, we observe that the ad-hoc characteristic of D2D communication also poses the truth-telling issue into the system. Additionally, we find out that that the transmission quality in D2D communications can be significantly improved through a proper resource exchange. Based on this observation, we propose a Trader-assisted Resource Exchange (T-REX) mechanism, an exchange-based mechanism that converges in polynomial time and achieves Pareto optimal. We prove that all rational D2D pairs will truthfully report their information when the trader preference functions are properly designed.

主讲人简介：Chih-Yu Wang received the B.S. and Ph.D. degrees in electrical engineering and communication engineering from National Taiwan University (NTU), Taipei, Taiwan, in 2007 and 2013, respectively. He has been a visiting student in University of Maryland, College Park in 2011. He is currently an Assistant Research Fellow with the Research Center for Information Technology Innovation, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan. His research interests include game theory, wireless communications, social networks, and data science.